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I. INTRODUCTION
When Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1 was unanimously2 handed
down by the U.S. Supreme Court on March 8, 1971, the decision did
not draw prominent headlines.3 The New York Times accorded the
ruling only a two-sentence summary on page twenty-one,4 and the
Wall Street Journal gave it modest attention on page four.5 The
Washington Post did give the decision front-page coverage,6 but
Gillette v. United States,7 a Selective Service Act case, was awarded a
prominent, top-of-the-page, two-column headline8 while Griggs
received secondary attention.
Notwithstanding how modest the contemporaneous news
coverage was, knowledgeable judges, scholars, and litigators quickly
acknowledged how Griggs actually had an import far beyond Gillette
and, at least in some eyes, also beyond a half dozen or more
historically notable rulings that likewise were handed down during
the first six months of 1971.9 Interviewed on July 1, 1971, just one day
after the conclusion of the Supreme Court's 1970 Term, Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger was asked to name "a case or two that to you stand
1. 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971).
2. Id. at 425 (with Justice Brennan recused).
3. Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of
the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 455 (2005)
("Griggs did not garner the big headlines in newspapers when the decision was announced by the
Court."); Albert W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972) ("issued without fanfare").
4. Supreme Court's Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1971, at 21.
5. Supreme Court Bars Employment Tests That Result in Anti-Negro Discrimination,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1971, at 4.
6. Job Tests Held in Violation of Rights Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1971, at Al.
7. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
8. John P. MacKenzie, Court Rejects CO Status in Specific War; Jurists Refuse to Broaden
Draft Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1971, at Al.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (denying a request
for injunctive relief to prevent the New York Times from publishing the contents of a classified
government document); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) (concluding that state aid
paid to teachers of church-related educational institutions was unconstitutional); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) (reversing the dismissal of the petitioner's
action for damages against federal agents for violating his Fourth Amendment rights); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (refusing to require a protestor to remove clothing containing
explicit language on First Amendment grounds); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971)
(holding that a District of Columbia statute prohibiting most abortions was not
unconstitutionally vague so long as the statute's exception for a woman's "health" was
interpreted to include a woman's psychological health in addition to physical health); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1971) (upholding the district court's
integration plan for a Charlotte school district); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47 (1971)
(holding that plaintiffs who feared violations of their constitutional rights did not have standing
to challenge a state criminal statute because they had not yet been indicted).
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as kind of landmarks" from his first two years on the Court. Rather
than citing either the Pentagon Papers case, issued just the day
before,10 or the famous school-busing case handed down on April 20,11
Burger instead responded that
I think there is one case that has been commented on a great deal by others as having
been . .. a "sleeper" . It was Griggs against Duke Power Company having to do with
equal employment opportunities. I wouldn't want to say that was one of the terribly
important cases but experts in that field of law considered it so, but it is not the kind of
a case that received any public attention.12
Just as Burger indicated, legal academics more than shared
his view. Writing some years later, but still prior to Griggs's twentieth
anniversary, the distinguished employment-law scholar Alfred W.
Blumrosen declared that "[flew decisions in our time-perhaps only
Brown v. Board of Education-have had such momentous social
consequences" as Griggs.13 Subsequent scholarly commentators
termed the ruling an "icon,"14 a "landmark,"15 a "milestone,"16 and "a
watershed decision."17 Likewise, arguably the most knowledgeable and
widely experienced civil rights litigator of the 1960s and 1970s, Jack
Greenburg, who was the Director-Counsel of the NAACP's Legal
Defense and Educational Fund ("LDF') from 1961 to 1984, echoed
Blumrosen's characterization, stating that "[i]n terms of the impact of
the change wrought, [Griggs] was almost on a par with the campaign
that won Brown."'8
Yet the high regard in which some jurists, law professors, and
lawyers held Griggs did not mean-just as on the day it first came
10. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 748.
11. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1, 28-29 (validating a Charlotte school system's integration
plan).
12. Conversation with the Chief Justice (ABC News Transcript), quoted in ROBERT BELTON,
THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE GRIGGS V. DuKE POWER STORY 329 n.10
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 2014).
13. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
14. Earl M. Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in the Impact of a
Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1353, 1370.
15. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 702
(2006).
16. NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT ENOUGH 108 (2006).
17. Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 153, 167 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
18. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 412 (1994); see also Belton, supra note 3,
at 433 ("Aside from Brown v. Board of Education, the single most influential civil rights case
during the past forty years that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, civil rights
jurisprudence and the discourse of equality is Griggs v. Duke Power Co."); James E. Jones Jr. The
Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 1 (1976) ("It is appropriate to compare its potential impact to that of Brown.").
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down-that the case was significantly memorialized far and wide.
Perhaps the best and most fully informed scholarly history of the
Burger Court, written by the late Bernard Schwartz,19 never even once
mentions Griggs, and the best-known biographies of the Justices who
heard the case likewise without exception fail to ever mention it.20
Indeed, despite the best efforts of an energetic and enterprising
journalist covering Griggs's twentieth anniversary to plumb
historians' interest in the case, a complaint from this Essay's author
summed up his findings: "Even though Griggs is a huge touchstone,
there's little history about it."21
II. THE ORIGINS OF GRIGGS
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. emerged from the immediate
aftermath of the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The legislative history of the Act's consideration, debate, and
amending in both houses of Congress has been revisited many times,22
but it bears strong emphasis that Title VII, targeted at eliminating
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in the employment arena, was "by far the longest and most
19. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM (1990).
20. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN (2005); DENNIS J.
HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE (1998); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD
BILL (2003); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK (1994); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL
(1998); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1992). No serious biography of either
Chief Justice Burger or Justice Potter Stewart has yet been written.
21. Drew Jubera, How Willie Griggs Changed the Workplace, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 1,
1991, at B1 (quoting David Garrow).
22. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 125-52 (1990) (describing the
obstacles that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 overcame on its path to becoming law); David B.
Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9-32 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (overviewing the
legislative process surrounding the 1964 Civil Rights Act); see also NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS
112-52 (2005) (detailing the battle to get the 1964 Civil Rights Act through the Senate); ROBERT
D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGATION (1990) (explaining the legislative strategy used to obtain
Congressional approval of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); ROBERT MANN, WHEN FREEDOM WOULD
TRIUMPH 185-208 (2007) (exploring the events leading up to the Senate's passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION To AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 199-230
(1997) (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1964's path through Congress); MICHAEL I. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 61-62 (1966) (same); CHARLES
WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985); John G. Stewart, The Civil Rights
Act of 1964: Tactics I, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 211-64 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997)
(detailing the " 'final drive' for cloture" and "the unanticipated problems faced by the pro-civil
rights senators in the 'post-cloture' environment on the Senate floor"). Graham's book is rich and
invaluable, but it is not without weaknesses and biases. The most extensive review of Graham's
work is Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723 (1991), a forty-two-page
review essay. See also David J. Garrow, Uncle Sam vs. Jim Crow, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD,
May 20, 1990, at 9 (reviewing Graham).
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complicated" title in the Act. 23 One contemporaneous commentator, an
attorney in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel,
rightly highlighted how "discrimination in employment is the most
widespread and undoubtedly the most harmful to its victims and to
the nation as a whole" of the multiple evils that the overall Act
banned.24 But the extensive Senate floor debate about Title VII,
including the defeat or adoption of multiple proposed amendments,
meant that the Title's final language, as President Lyndon B. Johnson
signed into law on July 2, 1964, left most well-informed participants
and onlookers uncertain of how the Title's application and
enforcement would play out.25
The primary uncertainty involved the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), newly created by Title V11 2 6 and
initially envisioned as having "principal enforcement responsibility"
for the Title's statutory prohibitions.27 Civil rights proponents had
originally sought to ensure that the EEOC would have meaningful
enforcement authority of its own, independent of the Department of
Justice's Civil Rights Division, but that goal had been a notable
casualty of Senate floor compromises required to maintain the support
of Republican Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen.28 Individuals who
23. Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOK. L. REV. 62, 63 (1964).
24. Id. at 62.
25. See id. at 64-68, 81 (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1964's legislative history and
noting that "it may be that an amendment to Title VII will be found necessary [to resolve the
Act's potential problems] after there has been some experience with the statute"); George
Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 690-96 (1980) (arguing that the
presumption in favor of class certification in Title VII class actions "has insufficient basis in
congressional intent as revealed in Title VII and its legislative history"); Francis J. Vaas, Title
VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS & COM. L. REV. 431, 433-58 (1966) (detailing Title VII's
convoluted legislative history and questioning whether that legislative history will "be of
material assistance in the administration of the act"); Comment, Enforcement of Fair
Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 431-34, 469 (1965)
(summarizing Title VII's legislative history and concluding that "[d]espite the inherent problems
in implementing any fair employment legislation, it should be possible to enforce title VII").
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 258 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012)).
27. Berg, supra note 23, at 81.
28. See Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VIIof the 1964 Civil Rights
Act: Legislative History and Litigation Report, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 317 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones Jr. eds., 1993) (quoting a January 4, 1973,
interview with Joseph L. Rauh regarding "the cease-and-desist powers that Senator Dirksen had
removed as the price of enactment of Title VIr); see also Wolfgang Saxon, Joseph Rauh Jr.,
Groundbreaking Civil Liberties Lawyer, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/05/us/joseph-rauh-jr-groundbreaking-civil-liberties-lawyer-dies-
at-81.html (noting Rauh's "strenuous Capitol Hill lobbying" on behalf of the Civil Rights Act);
U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CELEBRATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF TITLE VII,
PANEL I (2004), available at www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/40th/panel/40thpanels/panell/transcript
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believed themselves to be victims of discriminatory employment
practices could file written complaints with the Commission, but if the
EEOC, after investigating, adjudged that the allegation was true,
Title VII authorized it only to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion," and no more.29 One subsequent
commentator asserted that "Title VII was a carefully crafted
compromise that sought to accommodate both the perceived need for
federal action against employment discrimination and concerns about
preservation of employer autonomy."30 Others, however, were less
sanguine: a contemporary observer concluded that the Senate floor
action had "emasculated"31 the EEOC, and a veteran Justice
Department attorney and Title VII expert later recalled how "the
leadership of the civil rights community was disappointed with Title
VII and felt that it was largely unenforceable."32
Title VII's language did authorize the Justice Department, as
distinct from the EEOC, to initiate federal civil suits against
employers using discriminatory practices.33 It also empowered the
Attorney General to move for the appointment of special three-judge
district courts whose rulings would be directly appealable to the
Supreme Court,34 but even sympathetic Justice Department attorneys
forecasted that it was highly doubtful that the Department's Civil
Rights Division, already committed to litigating public
accommodations, voting, and school desegregation cases, "will be able
to devote as much attention to enforcement of Title VII as the
.html (Professor Michael H. Gottesman recounting how "it was necessary to agree that the EEOC
would not have either decision-making or enforcement power.").
29. § 706(b). The statute also imposed a confidentiality requirement concerning all such
EEOC efforts and even threatened Commission, staff with criminal penalties should that
stricture be violated: "Any officer or employee of the Commission, who shall make public in any
manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year." § 709(e).
30. Maltz, supra note 14, at 1358.
31. Comment, supra note 25, at 430.
32. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1133 (1989); see also James E. Jones Jr.,
Some Reflections on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 MERCER L. REV. 813,
820 n.35 (1985) (noting that a former senior U.S. Labor Department attorney recounted how he
"was bitterly disappointed with the compromise which emerged from Congress" and "expected
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Commission could have" had it been accorded actual enforcement
powers.35
Title VII also authorized victims of employment discrimination
whose complaints the EEOC found valid but was unable to
successfully conciliate to file federal civil suits against the alleged
offenders and also authorized the Justice Department to intervene in
support of such claims if the Attorney General so decided.36 In
retrospect, some civil rights attorneys believed that "[w]hen Title VII
passed, the role of private enforcement was expected to be minimal,"37
but contemporaneous commentators voiced uncertain expectations.
One Justice Department attorney stated that "[i]t seems questionable
that much can be accomplished through suits in federal court by
persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination,"38 in large part because "it
cannot be expected that many complainants will undertake the
burden of a lawsuit."39 He and others noted that "[w]hether class
actions are permissible is unclear," as Title VII failed to expressly
address that question.40 One prescient writer predicted that
"substantial litigation under Title VII may be anticipated" and
asserted that "enforcement of Title VII has been thrust squarely upon
the federal judiciary" given the final version of the statute.41
That writer, like others, frankly acknowledged that at bottom
"the conduct proscribed is vaguely defined"42 given Title VII's
profusion of language, but several particular provisions of section
703(h) appeared likely to prove crucial. One phrase authorized
employers to use "a bona fide seniority or merit system" in
differentiating between employees.43 A subsequent sentence, added on
the Senate floor following extensive debate over two amendments
offered by Texas Republican Senator John Tower, similarly provided
35. Berg, supra note 23, at 88; see also Rose, supra note 32, at 1137 ("The Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department decided after passage of the Civil Rights Act to give priority
first to public accommodations, then to voting, and then to school desegregation. As a result, only
two employment law suits were brought in 1965 and 1966 by the Division .....
36. § 706(f).
37. BELTON, supra note 12, at 30.
38. Berg, supra note 23, at 96.
39. Id. at 97.
40. Comment, supra note 25, at 455; see also Berg, supra note 23, at 86-87 (discussing the
"peculiar problems" with class actions in employment discrimination); Rutherglen, supra note 25,
at 695 ("[T]he importance of class actions was not anticipated at all.").
41. Comment, supra note 25, at 453-54.
42. Id. at 458; see also Timothy L. Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias: A
History, A Status Report, and A Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259, 309-10 (1968) (noting that the
author of § 703(h) "never explained it," which has "perpetuate[d] the lack of clarity").
43. § 703(h); see also George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VI, 73 VA. L. REV.
1297, 1305-07 (1987) (discussing the Towers amendment).
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that it would not "be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test . . . is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate" in distinguishing amongst
employees.44 However, as that early commentator discerningly
suggested regarding seniority practices, "even if the system is 'bona
fide,' an employer's management of it may be held discriminatory."45
Similarly, the precise wording of the subsequent sentence still "allows
a court to hold that the use of even an unbiased professionally
developed test was discriminatory."46 Given just how much
interpretive leeway Title VII, and particularly that crucial section
703(h), left open for subsequent fact finders, "the courts must fashion
a new body of federal case law" once suits began to be filed. 4 7
With a full calendar year scheduled to elapse between when
the 1964 Act was signed into law and when the primary sections of
Title VII would take effect,48 equal employment enforcement
considerations took a decided back seat on the federal civil rights
agenda. Far more immediately pressing concerns-prompt
implementation of Title II's prohibition of racial discrimination in
public accommodations; the early August 1964 discovery that three
civil rights workers had indeed been murdered in Neshoba County,
Mississippi;49 President Johnson's fall reelection campaign against
Republican nominee and Civil Rights Act opponent Senator Barry
Goldwater; and the early 1965 demonstrations in Selma, Alabama,
which prompted Johnson to offer a comprehensive voting rights bill to
Congress50-demanded "front burner" attention from Johnson and his
administration. Given all that was transpiring, journalists and
interested observers were not wholly astounded when President
Johnson waited until May 10, 1965, to nominate the five
commissioners who would oversee the EEOC, which would begin work
44. § 703(h).
45. Comment, supra note 25, at 464 n.226.
46. Id. at 465 n.227.
47. Id. at 454; see also Berg, supra note 23, at 88 ("Much will depend on the extent to which
effective relief proves available in suits brought in [private] suits. . .
48. § 716(a), (b).
49. Claude Sitton, F.B.L Finds 3 Bodies Believed to Be Rights Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1964, at 1 (reporting on the discovery of the bodies of three murdered civil rights workers in
Philadelphia, Miss.).
50. See generally DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA 1 (1978) ("[T]he story of how
southern blacks finally won equal voting rights cannot be fully appreciated without an
understanding of how ... protest helped them to achieve the remarkable gains they made.").
204 [Vol. 67:1:197
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on July 2.51 The Senate quickly confirmed those nominees, but well-
informed news coverage depicted a situation of "near anarchy" as the
new commissioners, lacking even office space, sought to create from
scratch an entirely new federal agency tasked with addressing "a
complex and ambiguous statute."52 In a prominent Wall Street Journal
story, the NAACP LDF's Director-Counsel Jack Greenberg called Title
VII "weak, cumbersome, probably unworkable," and in need of
amendment by Congress. He explained that the LDF would soon
launch a southwide grassroots effort to inform black citizens of the
new statute and to encourage them to file complaints of race
discrimination in employment with the brand-new EEOC: "We think
that the best way to get it amended is to show that it doesn't work."5 3
The LDF formally announced that summer project the day before Title
VII took effect,54 but a front-page New York Times story underscored
the widespread doubts about the provision's potential, stating that
"the law is cumbersome, possibly riddled with loopholes, and gives the
agency administering it . .. no enforcement powers."55
Over the ensuing four months, however, the beginnings of a
well-targeted LDF litigation campaign to maximize Title VII's
enforcement potential, and particularly to overcome the serious
possible hurdles written into section 703(h), slowly but seamlessly
emerged from the southwide summer project that had originated out
of Greenberg's belief that Title VII could not work. Within the first
four weeks after the statute took effect, the LDF, in tandem with the
NAACP, collected and filed with the EEOC more than fifty complaints
alleging racially discriminatory employment practices.56 Many of them
51. See Cabell Phillips, Franklin Roosevelt Jr. to Head Equal Job Opportunity Agency, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1965, at 1, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gstlabstract.html?res=
F50817FE3D5Fl47A93C3A8178ED85F418685F9 (reporting on President Johnson's initial
appointees to EEOC).
52. James Harwood, Battling Job Bias: Rights Groups May Ask Stiffening of '64 Law's
Employment Provisions, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1965, at 1.
53. Id.; see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 35-37 (describing LDF's "educational and
outreach phase"); GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 157-59, 177-80, 189-201 (describing initial
enforcement and staffing challenges of the EEOC); GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 413-14
(recounting LDF's campaign to develop Title VII case law).
54. See Panels to Press Job Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1965, at 32 (reporting on
NAACP's project to test fair labor provisions).
55. John Herbers, Bans on Job Bias Effective Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1965, at 1, 32.
Contemporary news stories presented Title VII's prohibition of sex as well as race discrimination
as an opportunity for ribald humor. "What about sex?" EEOC Chairman Franklin Roosevelt Jr.
was asked at a July 1 press conference. " 'Don't get me started,' Mr. Roosevelt replied with a
laugh. 'I'm all for it.' " Id. at 32.
56. Complaints Filed Under Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1965, at 23 (reporting on
earliest claims alleging discriminatory employment practices).
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cited major national corporations; one from Wilmington, N.C., named
A&P Food Stores, and in less than two months the EEOC upheld the
complaint against A&P, thereby authorizing a federal court suit. Both
Jack Greenberg's own rich historical memoir and the winsome
autobiography of top Greenberg deputy Michael Meltsner touch briefly
on the very first Title VII case that emerged from that effort, Brinkley
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 5 7 but only the late Professor
Robert Belton's almost definitive history of early employment equality
litigation, The Crusade for Equality in the Workplace, addresses in full
detail both that case and the others that soon followed in its wake.6 8
The class action complaint that Meltsner drafted for Brinkley,
Professor Belton reports, "served as a model for practically all the
complaints that the LDF, its cooperating attorneys," and other
litigators would file in subsequent employment discrimination cases.5 9
Brinkley was settled within three months of its filing, but the young
North Carolina attorney who actually brought the case, Julius
LeVonne Chambers, was quickly emerging as a remarkably energetic
and productive litigator. Only twenty-nine years old at the time,
Chambers had been editor in chief of the law review and graduated
first in his class at the University of North Carolina Law School in
1962, earned an additional L.L.M. degree at Columbia Law School,
and then chose a one-year internship at the LDF over a job offer from
the U.S. Department of Justice.60
57. GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 413 (discussing Brinkley v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
Civ. A. No. 1107 (E.D.N.C. filed Oct. 8, 1965)); MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER 20 & 271 n.1 (2006) (same).
58. BELTON, supra note 12, at 56-57. Professor Belton, who taught at Vanderbilt Law
School for thirty-four years, from 1975 until his retirement in 2009, died at age seventy-six in
early 2012; a newspaper obituary described him as "a popular and beloved teacher and mentor."
Pioneer Now Legacy, Professor Belton Lived So Others Could Achieve, TENN. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2012,
http://tntribune.com/education/880/.
59. BELTON, supra note 12, at 57.
60. L. Joseph Mosnier, Crafting Law in the Second Reconstruction: Julius Chambers, the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and Title VII 98-125, 163-96 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with Davis Library, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Chambers died at age seventy-six in August, 2013. See
Douglas Martin, Julius Chambers, 76, Dies; A Fighter for Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2013,
at A20; Mary C. Curtis, 'In the Presence of Justice': Remembering Julius Chambers, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/08/09/in-the-presence
-of-justice-remembering-julius-chambers; Dannye Romine Powell & David Perlmutt, Pioneering
Civil Rights Attorney Julius Chambers Dies, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 4, 2013,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/08/04/4211103/civil-rights-leader-julius-chambers.html;
see also DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING AND RACE 108-11 (1995) (chronicling
Chambers's upbringing, legal education, and career and describing the development of the
Swann litigation). The Mosnier dissertation is a superbly and impressively rich beginning of a
full scale biography of Chambers, a project that merits the highest importance. Surprisingly, no
other serious work has ever surveyed Chambers's remarkable legal career.
206 [Vol. 67:1:197
THE GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY
With financial assistance from the LDF, Chambers returned to
North Carolina in June 1964 and on July 1 opened a decidedly humble
law office in Charlotte, some sixty miles from his family's hometown.61
Little over six months later, he filed a school desegregation case that
would go on to become the most notable and decisive such case since
Brown itself: Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.62
And during the course of 1965 and 1966, he went on to file multiple
other school desegregation and employment discrimination cases all
across North Carolina. As the best-informed student of Chambers'
legal career has correctly stated, "Chambers would do more to shape
the contours of evolving civil rights law than .. . perhaps .. . any other
attorney of this period save . . . Jack Greenberg."63
By the end of 1966, no fewer than eleven of the LDF's overall
total of thirty-plus employment discrimination actions had been filed
by Chambers in North Carolina.64 The first actually reported case,
however, and a crucial achievement for LDF's litigators, came in
central Tennessee in March 1966, when U.S. District Judge Frank
Gray Jr. certified class action status in a suit against the Werthan
Bag Corporation brought two months after Brinkley.65 Judicial
acknowledgment that the victims of racially discriminatory
employment practices were indeed a class, not just discrete
individuals, was a decisive milestone for the LDF attorneys,66 and
during the early months of 1967, most of the suits that Chambers had
brought in North Carolina federal courts during 1966 were accorded
class action status.67
61. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 257.
62. See 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), affd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also of course
DOUGLAS, supra note 60 (focusing generally on the desegregation of Charlotte's public schools
after Brown and through the early 1970s).
63. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 246.
64. Id. at 309.
65. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
66. See BELTON, supra note 12, at 60-64 (discussing potential obstacles to class certification
of claims brought under Title VII and describing "the benefits of efficiency and economy," as well
as "enhance[d] settlement possibilities," of the class action device); Rutherglen, supra note 25, at
706-12 (pointing to a series of cases in which "the Fifth Circuit transformed the reasoning of
Hall into a doctrine supporting certification of'across-the-board' Title VII class actions").
67. BELTON, supra note 12, at 355 n.27; see also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp.
835 (M.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971) (enjoining




III. GRIGGS AND QUARLES IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
One of those cases, which Chambers had filed in the Middle
District of North Carolina on October 20, 1966, was on behalf of
thirteen black laborers at a Duke Power Company plant in
Rockingham County who had remained frozen into a racially separate,
lower-paid tier of employment despite Title VII's enactment.
Encouraged by a local NAACP activist, the black workers had first
met with Chambers in February 1966 and on March 1, 1966, had
delivered a written petition demanding changes to the plant's
superintendent, J. Donald Knight. The superintendent spoke politely
but unyieldingly with the men, and one evening several days later, the
workers all signed identical "Charge of Discrimination" forms that
Chambers' younger colleague Adam Stein had previously
mimeographed for similar complainants employed at Lorillard
Tobacco Company in nearby Greensboro. The EEOC received the
Duke Power charges on March 15, and just over a month later, two
EEOC investigators, Yancy Thompson and Harold Kramer, arrived at
the plant to conduct interviews.68
Prior to the publication of Professor Belton's The Crusade for
Equality, only one sadly disappointing book, originally written by
Robert Samuel Smith as a Ph.D. dissertation at Bowling Green State
University in 2002 and published in revised form in 2008, had sought
to provide a full history of the beginnings of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 69 Professor Belton's account of Griggs's origins is far superior to
Smith's, in measurable part because Professor Belton, unlike Smith,
was aware of and utilized Joseph Mosnier's superbly researched
unpublished 2004 Ph.D. dissertation on Julius Chambers. Mosnier
alone had obtained access to Duke Power's own private files on
Griggs,70 which among other documents contained a copy of the EEOC
investigators' "Final Investigation Report" detailing the "continuing
practice of segregation" at the Duke Power plant.7' That document
also reported how plant managers "were reluctant to cooperate . . . and
gave misleading answers"72 and how when the investigators then
68. See BELTON, supra note 12, at 107-16 (recounting "the factual setting" giving rise to the
Griggs litigation); Mosnier, supra note 60, at 342-65; Barry Bearak & David Lauter, Tense Steps
to Ending Racial Bias, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-
03/news/mn-1562_1_north-carolina (discussing Griggs in the first of a series of articles on
affirmative action); ROBERT SAMUEL SMITH, RACE, LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS 53-59, 81-88, 110-
12 (2008) (describing the openly discriminatory hiring and placement practices of Duke Power).
69. SMITH, supra note 68.
70. Mosnier, supra note 60, at xi, xxi, 396.
71. Id. at 366.
72. Id. at 365.
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traveled to Duke Power's corporate headquarters in Charlotte, they
received hardly better responses from the vice president, A.C. Thies,
and the company attorney, George W. Ferguson Jr. These two
company officials asserted that for the entire prior decade, Duke
Power had relied upon test results, not race, in selecting employees for
promotion, but the EEOC investigators judged that claim "to be
completely false."3 Two days later, however, Thies sent a memo-
cited by both Mosnier and Professor Belton-instructing all Duke
Power plants to immediately eliminate racially segregated employee
locker rooms. Almost two years after enactment of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and thanks only to the EEOC investigators' visit, did a
company as prominent as Duke Power finally move to end visibly
segregated practices.4
In early September 1966, some four months after the
investigators' visit, the EEOC formally endorsed the thirteen Duke
Power workers' complaints and informed them that the Commission's
"heavy workload" had prevented it from attempting any informal
conciliation with Duke Power.75 The following month, after an EEOC
conciliator did meet unproductively with Duke Power officials,76
Chambers filed Griggs, with the thirteen plaintiffs selecting the
member of their group who was the youngest and presumably least
worried about retaliatory termination, Willie Griggs, as the first
named complainant. Duke Power's attorney Ferguson, Mosnier
reports, jokingly but presciently jotted to a colleague that "[w]e need
more practice before the U.S. Sup. Ct.,"77 and in the months ahead,
Duke Power officials more than once rebuffed settlement discussions
proffered by Chambers and the LDF.78 Duke Power's Thies advised
Ferguson that "[b]ased on Mr. Chambers' overall approach to this
matter, I would suggest that we see him in Court."79
Sixteen months would go by before Griggs was finally set for
trial in February 1968, and in the interim, increased public and
judicial attention came to focus on large companies' ongoing
maintenance of racially separate white and black employee-promotion
practices.80 In May 1967, what would become by far the most
73. Id. at 366-67.
74. Id. at 368-69; see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 110.
75. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 370-71; see also SMITH, supra note 68, at 113.
76. BELTON, supra note 12, at 118.
77. Id. at 125; Mosnier, supra note 60, at 372.
78. BELTON, supra note 12, at 125-26, Mosnier, supra note 60, at 373-74.
79. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 374.
80. James P. Gannon, U.S. Prodding Plants to Merge Negro, White Job Promotion Lists,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1967, at Al.
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influential early district court Title VII case, Quarles v. Phillip Morris
Inc., went to trial in Richmond, Virginia, before Judge John D.
Butzner Jr. The history of the LDF's efforts in Quarles is richly
summarized and recounted in Professor Belton's The Crusade for
Equality,81 and just weeks after the case was tried, Judge Butzner was
nominated and confirmed for a seat on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.82
Thus when the decision in Quarles came down on January 4,
1968, it was authored by a circuit judge sitting by retroactive
designation in the district court. Prior to Title VII's enactment, Philip
Morris, along with Local 203 of the Tobacco Workers Union, had
maintained racially segregated employment classifications, and
postenactment, black employees with seniority were still barred from
transferring into previously all-white departments. Hence Judge
Butzner was able to state Quarles's decisive issue acutely: "Are
present consequences of past discrimination covered by the act?"83
Judge Butzner detailed how the present seniority system "limits on a
nondiscriminatory basis the transfer privileges of individual Negroes
assigned to the prefabrication department years ago pursuant to a
policy of segregation which has long since been abolished."84 Judge
Butzner explained that his analysis of the case had been significantly
informed by a "perceptive" student note published in the Harvard Law
Review in April 1967, upon which he had "freely drawn."85 Given how
Title VII's plain language did not exclude from coverage "present
discrimination that originated in seniority systems devised before the
effective date," Judge Butzner concluded that "Congress did not intend
to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory
81. BELTON, supra note 12, at 76-93. As Belton notes, id. at 90, Quarles was the first case
in which the EEOC filed an amicus brief on its own, independent of the Justice Department;
EEOC attorney David Cashdan recounted how that came to pass in U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 28. See also BENJAMIN W. WOLKINSON, BLACKS, UNIONS, AND
THE EEOC 48 (1973) (describing unsuccessful conciliation attempts between the EEOC and the
Crown Zellerbach Corporation in the course of another union discrimination case); Nicholas
Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency: Enforcement of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 1965-1971, 110 AM. J. Soc. 709, 731-32
(2004) (explaining that the EEOC faced strong incentives "to work closely and cooperate with
civil rights advocates . .. pushing for liberal interpretation of discriminatory seniority systems"
in the years following Title VII's enactment).
82. John D. Butzner Jr., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.flc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=
337&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
83. Quarles v. Philip Morris Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1968).
84. Id. at 515.
85. Id. at 510 (citing Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967)).
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patterns that existed before the Act."86 With specific reference to
section 703(h), Judge Butzner held that "a departmental seniority
system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide
seniority system" within the protective language that the Senate had
added to Title VII.7 He thus stated accordingly, "Present
discrimination may be found in contractual provisions that appear fair
on their face, but which operate unfairly because of the historical
discrimination that undergirds them."88
With little delay, Judge Butzner's holding in Quarles, from
which the defendants did not appeal,89 became a recurring touchstone,
as first the Justice Department filed suit in United States v. Local 189,
United Papermakers against racially discriminatory employment
practices at a large Crown Zellerbach Corporation papermill in
Bogalusa, Louisiana,90 and then Griggs itself came to trial before
District Judge Eugene Gordon in Greensboro. Robert Belton joined
Julius Chambers in putting on the Griggs plaintiffs' case. Belton had
joined the LDF as an attorney in December 1965, just six months after
his graduation from Boston University School of Law, and by early
1966, he had major responsibility for the LDF's Title VII cases.91 His
book The Crusade for Equality provides a detailed account of the
obstacles the two young attorneys encountered.
Belton's most difficult challenge involved the last-minute
unavailability, and indeed temporary disappearance, of his scheduled
expert witness, Columbia University educational psychologist Robert
L. Thorndike. Following the case's first day of testimony, Belton had
to fly to New York City to locate either Thorndike or some acceptable
replacement before an unhappy Judge Gordon reconvened the trial
86. Id. at 515, 516.
87. Id. at 517; see also Note, supra note 85, at 1272 n.65 (" 'Bona fide' ... would seem to
mean absence of discriminatory intent . ... ").
88. Id. at 518.
89. GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 417; BELTON, supra note 12, at 96. On Quarles, see also
William H. Lewis Jr., Note, Civil Rights-Racially Discriminatory Employment Practices Under
Title VII, 46 N.C. L. REV. 891, 891-95 (1968); William B. Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker:
Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969).
90. United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), affd,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). On Bogalusa, see Adam Fairclough's superb RACE AND DEMOCRACY
344-80 (1995), Peter Jan Honigsberg's impressive and wonderfully evocative CROSSING BORDER
STREET 21-57, 71-78, 104-09, 134-48 (2000), and Timothy J. Minchin's impressively researched
THE COLOR OF WORK 14-15, 63-66, 93-98, 103-06, 150-51, 165-67 (2001). See also JOEL
WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 131-38 (2009); LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR
DEFENSE 78-164 (2004).
91. BELTON, supra note 12, at 38-39. On Belton's earlier life, see id. at 39-40 and Robert
Belton, Brown as a Work in Progress: Still Seeking Consensus After All These Years, 34 STETSON
L. REV. 487, 489-91 (2005).
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several days later.92 Belton was more than fortunate to secure Dr.
Richard Barrett, an industrial psychologist, as his new expert, and
with less than twenty-four hours' notice, Barrett flew to Greensboro
and reviewed the evidence and deposition testimony Chambers and
Belton had gathered regarding Duke Power's employment practices.
Duke Power put on an expert witness of its own, but otherwise, the
only live testimony at the Griggs trial was from Duke Power's A.C.
Thies, whom the EEOC investigators had questioned almost two years
earlier.93 Professor Belton reports that all thirteen of the plaintiffs
were present at trial, but the attorneys introduced their depositions
rather than put on any live testimony beyond Dr. Barrett. Belton and
Chambers prepared a substantial posttrial brief, and in late June,
Judge Gordon heard posttrial arguments and took the case under
advisement.94
Hardly six weeks after the Griggs trial, Judge Frederick J.R.
Heebe, the Louisiana federal district judge handling Local 189, the
Justice Department's lawsuit against Crown Zellerbach and the
Louisiana papermill's union, issued a strongly worded preliminary
injunction ordering the abolition of racially discriminatory seniority
practices at the plant. Citing Judge Butzner's opinion in Quarles,
Judge Heebe held that the mill's "seniority and recall
system ... perpetuates the consequences of past discrimination, and is
unlawful under Title VII ... Obviously, that seniority system was not
a bona fide seniority system within the meaning of § 703(h)."
Expressly rejecting the union's contention that Title VII could not
alter seniority practices, Judge Heebe stated that "[w]e agree
wholeheartedly with the conclusion in Quarles."95
Come mid-July 1968, the LDF, with Robert Belton and his
younger colleague Gabrielle Kirk in the lead, convened a two-day
conference of over one hundred interested attorneys in New York City
to discuss Title VII litigation. The LDF and cooperating attorneys now
had fifty-four active employment cases, and one of the attorneys told
reporters that intelligence tests and seniority provisions were "the
most frequently used means of discrimination against minority-group
92. BELTON, supra note 12, at 127-31.
93. Id. at 130-34; RICHARD S. BARRETT, CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES, at xi, 2 (1998); see also SMITH, supra note 68, at 121-22; Belton, supra note 3, at 443.
94. BELTON, supra note 12, at 134-38.
95. Local 189, 282 F. Supp. at 44. Judge Heebe proceeded to a trial in the case on April 30,
1968, and fourteen months later issued extremely extensive Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and a very detailed Decree. United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 301 F. Supp.
906 (E.D. La. 1969).
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workers." LDF Director-Counsel Jack Greenberg explained that
[t]he problem of seniority is how to unravel threads of discrimination which existed for
years. Separate seniority lines are a clear violation of the act, but in many cases it is not
clear what is the best way that segregated seniority lines can be merged or connected
without destroying the seniority system.
9 6
As if to illustrate those difficulties, in late September, Judge
Gordon issued his decision in Griggs, rejecting entirely the evidence of
discriminatory practices Belton and Chambers had put before him.
Judge Gordon noted that two black employees, both high school
graduates, had been promoted into previously all-white jobs before
Griggs was filed. "It is obvious that where discrimination existed in
the past, the effects of it will be carried over into the present," Judge
Gordon acknowledged, but he asserted that the behavior of Duke
Power, which refused to admit any pre-Title VII discrimination
against black employees, was "distinguishable from" Philip Morris's
conduct as revealed in Quarles.97 Expressly rejecting Judge Butzner's
analysis, Judge Gordon declared that "[i]f the decision in Quarles may
be interpreted to hold that present consequences of past
discrimination are covered by the Act, this Court holds otherwise."
Duke Power's instituting of intelligence tests as well as a high school
diploma requirement for interdepartmental promotions, Judge Gordon
concluded, were entirely reasonable.98
IV. JOHN MINOR WISDOM AND FREEZING
In subsequent months, contending parties in other ongoing
Title VII federal district court cases marshaled dueling precedents, as
plaintiffs invoked both Quarles and Judge Heebe's holding in Local
189, while defendant-employers cited Judge Gordon's conclusions in
Griggs.99 But the next major development in the evolving law of
employment discrimination took place only in late July 1969, when
Judge John Minor Wisdom, writing for a unanimous Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel, strongly affirmed Judge Heebe's findings and
decree in Local 189. Judge Wisdom framed the key Title VII issue
succinctly, almost echoing Jack Greenberg's statement from a year
96. C. Gerald Fraser, Tactics Planned on Job Bias Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1968, at 17.
97. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 248, 249 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
98. Id. at 249, 250.
99. See United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 62, 63, 75 (N.D. Ala.), vacated,
491 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that defendants relied on Griggs as to the subject of
transfers of employees to other departments).
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earlier: "how to reconcile equal employment opportunity today with
seniority expectations based on yesterday's built-in racial
discrimination."100
Judge Wisdom's opinion almost immediately cited Quarles and
noted how it had "heavily relied on" the 1967 Harvard Law Review
note: "In this case we draw heavily on Quarles and the note."10
Wisdom quoted at length from Judge Butzner's analysis of the section
703(h) "bona fide seniority systems" issue and observed that "[t]he
crux of the problem is how far the employer must go to undo the
effects of past discrimination."102 The controlling standard, Judge
Wisdom concluded, would be "business necessity. When an employer or
union has discriminated in the past and when its present policies
renew or exaggerate discriminatory effects, those policies must yield,
unless there is an overriding legitimate, non-racial business
purpose."103 At Crown Zellerbach, "[j]ob seniority, embodying as it
does, the racially determined effects of a biased past, constitutes a
form of present racial discrimination." Judge Wisdom explained that
the seniority issue was not the first time that the Fifth Circuit had
been confronted with "a change in system that is apparently fair on its
face but in fact freezes into the system advantages to whites and
disadvantages to Negroes."104 Judge Butzner had implicitly invoked
that same concept in Quarles when he too had used the word
"freeze,"105 but Judge Wisdom explained it far more fully, citing to his
own well-known 1963 opinion for a special three-judge district court in
an important voting rights case titled United States v. Louisiana.06
In the Louisiana case, the panel had rejected the state's effort
to institute a new, objective, but very difficult voter registration test,
one far more demanding than Louisiana's previously quite lax actual
registration standards. Any test "more demanding than those
previously applied," Judge Wisdom had written there, "will have the
100. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1969)
(emphasis added), abrogated by Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 982-83 n.2; see also Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1158, 1161 (1971) (observing how
the 1967 Note "has played a significant role in the development of the law" and how "[tihe most
influential early case was Quarles").
102. Id. at 987-88.
103. Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 990.
105. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
106. 225 F. Supp. 353, 393-94 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); see also David J.
Garrow, Visionaries of the Law: John Minor Wisdom and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J.
1219, 1220-21 (2000) (discussing Judge Wisdom's landmark ruling in United States v.
Louisiana).
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effect of perpetuating the differences created by the discriminatory
practices of the past."107 As he went on to explain,
The cessation of past discriminatory practices cannot justify the imposition of new and
onerous requirements, theoretically applicable to all, but practically affecting primarily
those who bore the brunt of previous discrimination. An appropriate remedy therefore
should undo the results of past discrimination as well as prevent future inequality of
treatment.10 8
Concerning voter registration, any new, higher standard would "freeze
the result of past illegal practices."109
Judge Wisdom's analysis was adopted by the Fifth Circuit just
a few months later, with Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle writing in
United States v. Duke that "[t]he term 'freezing' is used in two senses."
When illegal discrimination ends, "but a new and more onerous
standard is adopted before the disadvantaged class may enjoy" what
already is enjoyed by others, "this amounts to 'freezing' the privileged
status for those who acquired it during the period of discrimination,
and 'freezing out' the group discriminated against."o10 Less than a year
later, after hearing a direct appeal of the Louisiana case, the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted Judge Wisdom's analysis and affirmed the
district court panel, with Justice Hugo Black writing on behalf of a
unanimous bench that "the court has not merely the power, but the
duty, to render a decree which will, so far as possible, eliminate the
107. 225 F. Supp. at 393.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added). Judge Wisdom's analysis had been foreshadowed seven
weeks earlier in an opinion by his Fifth Circuit colleague Judge Richard Rives in a voter
registration case from Dallas County, Alabama: "Freezing results when there have been past
discriminatory practices, these practices are discontinued, but some action is taken which is
designed to retain the status quo, the position of advantage which one class has already obtained
over the other." United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 1963). Unlike Judge
Wisdom's analysis in Louisiana, Judge Rives's language in Atkins-"designed"-appeared to bar
only new practices adopted with discriminatory intent. Id. Five months later, after Judge
Wisdom's Louisiana opinion had been issued, Judge Rives tellingly eliminated any invocation of
purpose when he restated his Atkins language and adopted some of Judge Wisdom's in a
dissenting opinion in United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, 837 (5th Cir. 1964):
Freezing results when there have been past discriminatory practices, these
discriminatory practices are discontinued, but new and more onerous requirements
are imposed. While theoretically applicable to all, these new requirements primarily
affect those who bore the brunt of previous discriminations and tend to maintain the
position of advantage which one class has already obtained over the other."
Once again employing the distinguishing word, Rives stated that "the nondiscriminatory use of
stricter standards does not rectify the freezing effect caused by past injustices ..... Id. at 838.
110. United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 768 (5th Cir. 1964). The "Duke" in this case,
Panola County, Mississippi circuit court clerk Leonard Duke, was entirely distinct from Duke
Power Co.
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discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in
the future.""'
In his 1969 Local 189 opinion, Judge Wisdom built directly
upon the analytical foundation created to remedy discriminatory voter
registration practices: "When an employer adopts a system that
necessarily carries forward the incidents of discrimination into the
present, his practice constitutes on-going discrimination." In addition,
citing Judge Gordon's 1968 district court opinion in Griggs, the Fifth
Circuit panel declared that "[t]o the extent that Griggs departs from
that view, we find it unpersuasive."11 2
V. GRIGGS ON APPEAL
The LDF's appeal from Gordon's ruling in Griggs had been
argued to a panel of Fourth Circuit judges by Jack Greenberg in April
1969, three months before the Fifth Circuit publicly rejected Gordon's
decision.113 As Professor Belton's The Crusade for Equality richly and
originally describes, however, at conference immediately following the
oral arguments, the three panel members, Judges Simon E. Sobeloff,
Herbert S. Boreman, and Albert V. Bryan Jr. were unable to reach
any conclusion about how to decide Griggs. Relying upon the
comprehensive case file retained and publicly available in Judge
Sobeloffs papers, Professor Belton narrates how initially Judge
Sobeloff, the senior member of the panel, took responsibility for
drafting an opinion but then, overloaded with other cases, asked the
Circuit's Chief Judge to reassign it to one of his colleagues, whereby it
was given to Judge Boreman.114 More than five months then passed
111. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 90,
at 117, 277; Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 289, 297 (1969) ("[T]hroughout the years
Gaston County systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational opportunities it
granted to its white citizens. 'Impartial' administration of the literacy test today would serve
only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form"); Owen M. Fiss, Gaston County v. United
States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 379, 382 (stating that the freezing
principle "invalidates standards that would perpetuate or continue the effects of past
discrimination").
112. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994 (5th Cir. 1969),
abrogated by Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1988); see also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 90, at 133-35, 324-25 (discussing Wisdom's analysis in Local 189)
113. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 379 (noting that Julius Chambers argued Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education to the Fourth Circuit the preceding day, April 9,
1969); see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 150.
114. BELTON, supra note 12, at 150-51. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 380 (quoting from the
notes Judge Sobeloff jotted down during the oral argument and preserved, including "Present
effects of past discrimination must be shot down."). Judge Sobeloff had served as Solicitor
General of the United States from February 1954 until he was nominated and confirmed as a
judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1956. Regrettably, although almost 400 boxes of
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before Boreman circulated an initial draft opinion stating that Duke
Power's promotional practices were valid under Title VII. While Judge
Bryan joined it the very next day, Judge Sobeloff waited several weeks
before telling his colleagues that he would be writing an alternative
opinion."5 When Judge Boreman, following long-standing Fourth
Circuit practice, then shared his draft opinion with all of his
colleagues, Judge John Butzner, who almost two years earlier had
authored Quarles, circulated a memo to Judge Boreman and all the
other judges pointing out both a June 1969 Harvard Law Review
article published after the Griggs oral argument as well as Judge
Wisdom's Fifth Circuit opinion that had come down in late July. The
memo specifically quoted how the Fifth Circuit had characterized the
Griggs district court opinion as "unpersuasive.""6
The Harvard article, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, measuring in at more than eighty pages,117 was
authored by Columbia University law professor George Cooper and
University of Michigan law professor Richard B. Sobol, both of whom
had come to represent he black workers in the Local 189 case through
the good offices of the Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Committee.18
Judge Wisdom had added several citations to the article to his Fifth
Judge Sobeloff's papers reside in the Library of Congress's Manuscript Division, no biography of
Sobeloff as yet exists. See Warren E. Burger, A Tribute to Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, 34 MD. L.
REV. 483, 483 (1974) ("He contributed richly to the law, and he will be sorely missed."). Judge
Sobeloffs opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen burg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138, 148 (4th
Cir. 1970), is just as deserving of historical prominence as is his role in Title VII's history.
115. BELTON, supra note 12, at 150.
116. Id. at 151-52.
117. George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969). Professor Belton writes that "[tihe article provided a powerful theoretical foundation that
supported an argument that specific intent or proof of 'evil motive' was not the only theory of
discrimination applicable to employment claims under Title VII," BELTON, supra note 12, at 142,
but any present day reader is likely to find the article exhaustive.
118. See BELTON, supra note 12, at 105 (summarizing the careers of Cooper and Sobol). The
now little-remembered LCDC, led by Henry Schwarzschild, played a valuable role in southern
civil rights legal work from 1964 through 1970. The only existing history of the organization is
Thomas M. Hilbink, Filling the Void: The Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Committee and the
1964 Freedom Summer (1993) (unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, Columbia University).
See also HONIGSBERG, supra note 90, at 2-3, 71-78 (describing the author's personal experience
working at the LCDC). For more on the life of Schwarzschild, see MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD
AND THE LAW 7-16 (1993); Eric Pace, Henry Schwarzschild, 70, Opponent of Death Penalty, N.Y
TIMES, June 4, 1996, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/04/us/henry-
schwarzschild-70-opponent-of-death-penalty.html; and Thomas M. Hilbink, Essay, A Moralist in
a Legal World: A Memorial Essay for Henry Schwarzschild, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
199, 199 (1997).
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Circuit opinion before he issued it,119 and prepublication copies of the
article had informed LDF attorneys' arguments prior to 1969.120 Both
authors had joined in assisting the LDF lawyers with the appeal of
Griggs, and Professor Belton credits Cooper with "a major role,"
reporting that "Cooper wrote an outstanding draft" of the plaintiffs'
brief in the Fourth Circuit, one that was filed following "only a few
minor substantive changes."121
Within a week of the circulation of Judge Butzner's memo,
Judge Sobeloff circulated a draft of his opinion, telling his colleagues
he hoped it could win support and become the panel's majority opinion
but that in the alternative, it would be his dissent. Two days later,
Judge Bryan, after commending Judge Sobeloff for his efforts, stated
he would remain with Judge Boreman. Yet another entreaty from
Judge Butzner was also unavailing. Judge Boreman, now clearly
peeved, circulated a strongly worded memo calling Duke Power's
policies "valid" and "genuine" and declaring his certitude that
"Congress did not intend ... to give Negroes preferential treatment or
privileged treatment."122
The Crusade for Equality's account of these intracourt
exchanges and debates is both telling and fascinating; when on
January 9, 1970, the two-to-one panel ruling was publicly issued, with
Judge Sobeloff concurring in part and dissenting in part, a clear
majority of the Fourth Circuit's active judges had privately indicated
their preference for Judge Sobeloff's opinion rather than Judge
Boreman's.123 The panel majority reversed the district court in part,
ordering that promotional opportunities be accorded to six of the
individual plaintiffs,124 but otherwise affirmed that Duke Power's use
of intelligence tests and a high school diploma requirement were
"valid under Title VIJ."125 Yet the opinion that ultimately carried the
119. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982 n.2, 986 n.7, 987
n.8 (5th Cir. 1969), abrogated by Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1988); see
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 90, at 135-38 (discussing Wisdom's inclusion of references to Cooper
and Sobol's article in the footnotes of Local 189).
120. BELTON, supra note 12, at 84.
121. Id. at 43, 141-43. Belton states that "Cooper had a keen interest in working on
Griggs." Id.
122. Id. at 151-55.
123. Id. at 155-56. Judge Butzner told Judge Sobeloff that his dissent "will command wide
respect" and was significant given how Title VII "is one of the most important statutes of recent
years." Id. at 154; see also SMITH, supra note 68, at 156 (quoting further from Judge Butzner's
November 19, 1969, letter that Judge Sobeloff's analysis "will help people get jobs commensurate
with their ability, and it will strike the mark of race that all too often banishes them from
advancement").
124. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1236 (4th Cir. 1970).
125. Id. at 1235.
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day and illuminated the path of the law was Judge Sobeloffs, which
built upon the previous opinions of Judges Butzner and Wisdom in the
Quarles and Local 189 cases, respectively, both of whom Judge
Sobeloff cited by name.126 The opinion also relied upon the Cooper and
Sobol Harvard Law Review article, which Judge Sobeloff additionally
cited.127
Judge Sobeloff began his opinion by declaring that "[t]he
decision we make today is likely to be as pervasive in its effect as any
we have been called upon to make in recent years" and highlighting
how Judges Boreman and Bryan's upholding of Duke Power's tests
and diploma requirement notwithstanding their impact on black
employees "puts this circuit in direct conflict with the Fifth." At issue
was whether Title VII "shall remain a potent tool for equalization of
employment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous but hollow
rhetoric" and whether "practices that are fair in form but
discriminatory in substance" would pass muster under the law. "The
critical inquiry is business necessity," Judge Sobeloff wrote, "and if it
cannot be shown that an employment practice which excludes blacks
stems from legitimate needs the practice must end."128
A business necessity standard, Judge Sobeloff said, would void
employment requirements that disfavor African Americans "unless
they have significant relation to performance on the job." Allowable
"standards must be 'job-related,"' and "educational and cultural
differences caused by that history of deprivation may not be fastened
on as a test for employment when they are irrelevant to the issue of
whether the job can be adequately performed." With Duke Power's
practices, the Judge explained, "there is an utter failure to establish
that they sufficiently measure the capacity of the employee to perform
any of the jobs" promotion to which required meeting the heightened
employment standards. By instituting new, higher standards, just like
in the voting cases, "this policy disadvantages those who were not
favored with the lax criteria used for whites" in earlier years. Thus, he
reasoned, "a neutral superstructure built upon racial patterns that
were discriminatorily erected in the past comes within the Title VII
ban."129
Quoting by name Judge Butzner's sentence using the word
"freeze" in Quarles, Judge Sobeloff explained the parallel, writing that
126. Id. at 1237, 1241 n.9.
127. Id. at 1237 n.2. Samuel Estreicher asserts that Judge Sobeloff "relied" upon the Cooper
and Sobol article but omits any reference to Judge Sobeloffs by-name citations to Judges
Butzner and Wisdom. Estreicher, supra note 17, at 155 n.10.
128. Id. at 1237-38.
129. Id. at 1239, 1240, 1247.
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"[t]he 'freezing principle' (more properly, the anti-freezing principle)
developed by the Fifth Circuit in voting cases is analogous." Quoting
at length from Chief Judge Tuttle's opinion in United States v. Duke,
where that court voided "new, unquestionably even-
handed. . . requirements which had the effect of excluding new
applicants," Judge Sobeloff concluded by insisting that Title VII too
should bar "'freeze outs' . . . where the 'freeze' is achieved by
requirements that are arbitrary and have no real business
justification."130
VI. GRIGGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Fourth Circuit result in Griggs left the LDF lawyers and
their allies divided over whether to petition for Supreme Court review
of the decision. Both George Cooper, the Columbia law professor who
was playing such an influential, if unheralded, role in Title VII
litigation, and John Pemberton Jr., the ACLU's former executive
director who had subsequently become the EEOC's deputy general
counsel, initially opposed asking the high court to accept Griggs. Both
men contended that the case's factual record was more weakly
developed than others that had not yet been addressed by the federal
courts of appeal. Allied attorneys at the Department of Justice also
opposed the LDF petitioning for review of Griggs, but Robert Belton,
who in late 1969 had moved from New York to join Julius Chambers'
small law firm in Charlotte, returned to Manhattan to discuss the
issue face-to-face with LDF Director-Counsel Jack Greenberg. After a
brief discussion, Greenberg agreed that a petition for certiorari should
indeed be filed.131 Belton later recalled that Judge Sobeloff's "powerful
opinion"132 "was the deciding factor that convinced the LDF to seek
review."133
The LDF's petition, written primarily by George Cooper, was
filed in the Supreme Court on April 9, 1970, followed a month later by
Duke Power's response.134 The LDF emphasized that "[t]he
130. Id. at 1247, 1248.
131. BELTON, supra note 12, at 8, 159, 161-64; GEORGE COOPER & HARRIET RABB, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 495-500 (1972); GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 385-86, 551 n.79,
GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 419; SMITH, supra note 68, at 158; Robert Belton, A Comparative
Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 905, 942-43 (1978); Belton, supra note 3, at 453. On Jack Pemberton, see Bob Egelko, Jack
Pemberton Dies, Led ACLU in Turbulent '60s, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 2009; Douglas Martin, John
Pemberton Jr., Civil Rights Crusader, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009.
132. BELTON, supra note 12, at 159.
133. Belton, supra note 3, at 453.
134. Id.; BELTON, supra note 12, at 43, 142, 164-65, SMITH, supra note 68, at 158.
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importance of this case was eloquently stated in Judge Sobeloff's
dissent," which it proceeded to quote from multiple times at some
length.135 The petition also stressed how the panel majority's holding
conflicted with what the LDF called "the leading case" on Title VII,
Judge Wisdom's Local 189 opinion for the Fifth Circuit, 36 which it
noted the Justices had declined to review just six weeks earlier. 137 The
Justices discussed the case on May 22, 1970, and decided to request
from Solicitor General Erwin Griswold the executive branch's view of
whether Griggs should be heard.138 In mid-June, Griswold, joined by
the head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, Assistant
Attorney General Jerris Leonard, filed a brief supporting the LDF's
petition and telling the Court that the issue in Griggs "is one of high
importance."l39 Employment practices like Duke Power's were
"widespread," the government said, notwithstanding how "those
criteria bear no demonstrable relationship to employees' abilities to
perform the jobs for which they are used."40 Such standards, the
government stated, disqualify "substantially higher proportions" of
blacks than whites, and thus "the use of such criteria needlessly
perpetuates the ffects of past discrimination" and is prohibited by
Title VII.141
Less than two weeks after receiving the Justice Department's
full-bore endorsement of the LDF's petition, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari,142 with at least seven Justices voting to grant and
only one-Chief Justice. Warren E. Burger-opposed.143 In mid-
August, the petitioners filed their brief, followed three weeks later by
the Justice Department's amicus brief on the merits. The plaintiffs'
brief, which Professor Belton relates was again written almost entirely
by Columbia law professor George Cooper,144 stressed that Griggs, the
135. Petiton for Writ of Certiorari, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 1405),
in COOPER & RABB, supra note 131, at 508, 514. This petition, unlike subsequent briefs, is not
available in online databases, but it is accessible in COOPER & RAAB, supra note 131, at 501-17.
136. COOPER & RABB, supra note 131, at 513.
137. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
138. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 398 U.S. 926 (1970).
139. BELTON, supra note 12, at 167.
140. Id. at 168.
141. Id. at 166-68; U.S. Backs Job Test Protest by Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1970, at 35.
It may bear noting that while Solicitor General Griswold had been nominated to that post by
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, like Attorney General John
N. Mitchell, had been named by President Richard M. Nixon.
142. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
143. BELTON, supra note 12, at 168 (citing to Justice William 0. Douglas's case file).
144. Id. at 43, 105, 142, 164-65, 168, 212. Other attorneys, Professor Belton writes, "made
only a few suggested changes or additions to Cooper's draft." Id. at 168.
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first Title VII case the Court would hear, "follows five years of
experience under this landmark statute during which courts have
been enlightened and perceptive in giving it a broad and flexible
interpretation." Griggs would be the Justices' "first opportunity to
affirm or reject an important general course which the lower courts
have taken," and the LDF brief, quoting by name the first sentence of
Judge Sobeloff's dissent, echoed his emphasis by underscoring how the
Court's ruling would "fundamentally determine the future direction of
Federal fair employment law."145
The Solicitor General's brief highlighted how the Guidelines on
Employment Testing Procedures, which the EEOC had perfected over
the past four years, permitted only employment tests that were "job-
related" and prohibited "employment screening devices which do not
measure abilities to perform specific jobs but do seriously limit
employment and promotion opportunities for Negroes."146 Just as the
plaintiffs had, the government too stressed that "[1]ower federal courts
have consistently endorsed the proposition that the ongoing effects of
past racial discrimination may be remedied under Title VII." 1 47 Jurists
should focus not on an employer's motive, the government argued, but
on its need, for "the congressional purpose in enacting Title VII
was . . . to accomplish economic results, not merely to influence
motives or feelings."48 Addressing in particular how the language of
section 703(h) emerged from Senate floor action, the Solicitor General
stated that "[t]here is no basis for inferring from this history that the
job-relatedness standard ... was not to apply to the tests authorized"
as lawful. 149
Duke Power's reply brief was filed in mid-October 1970,150 but
from mid-summer into late fall, additional lower federal court rulings
continued to apply the Title VII standards that Judges Butzner,
Wisdom, and Sobeloff had articulated in Quarles, Local 189, and
Griggs. Writing for a Fourth Circuit panel in a case where a North
Carolina company had maintained racially segregated employee
facilities as late as mid-1967, Judge Harrison L. Winter held that the
145. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 70-124),
1970 WL 122448.
146. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124),
1970 WNL 122637.
147. Id. at 11.
148. Id. at 15-16.
149. Id. at 29. Samuel Estreicher asserts, relative to Griggs's outcome, that "[p]erhaps the
most important factor was the position of the Nixon Administration, as evidenced by the Solicitor
General Griswold's amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs," but does not support that
contention by citing to the briefs content or arguments. Estreicher, supra note 17, at 163.
150. Brief for Respondent, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124), 1970 WL 136686.
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law "provides a remedy for the present and continuing effects of past
racial discrimination," quoting in full and by name Judge Butzner's
"freeze" sentence from Quarles.15  Judge Butzner was a fellow panel
member, but, perhaps more strikingly, so was Judge Boreman, yet
there was no dissent from Judge Winter's declaration that "[p]resent
policies and practices which . . . no matter how neutral in appearance,
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination are unlawful and should
be immediately enjoined."15 2
Similarly, in mid-August, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
panel ruling in a case involving a trucking company noted how "[s]ince
Quarles, numerous cases have held that superficially neutral policies
violate Title VII if their effect is to perpetuate past racial
discrimination."5 3 Noting the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the "business
necessity" standard and quoting from its opinion in Local 189, the
Tenth Circuit held that "[t]he remedial nature of Title VII requires the
adoption of the business necessity test. . . . When a policy is
demonstrated to have discriminatory effects, it can be justified only by
a showing that it is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business."54
Come early November, Eastern District of Louisana Judge
Heebe, who already had encountered Title VII in the Local 189 case,
ruled in similar case involving a different union local at Crown
Zellerbach that the "business necessity" standard applied and noted
how the Fourth Circuit panel's majority opinion in Griggs "has been
rejected in this circuit." Specifically addressing the language of section
703, Judge Heebe quoted the statute's language authorizing tests that
"are not 'designed, intended or used to discriminate'" before declaring
that Crown Zellerbach's "tests are 'used to discriminate' because they
greatly prefer whites to Negroes without business necessity." Citing by
name to what he termed Judge Sobeloffs "incisive" dissenting opinion
151. United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 803 (4th Cir. 1970). In subsequent
years, both Professor Belton and Julius Chambers would forcefully insist that "[t]he major force
pushing litigation has been private litigation, not government-initiated litigation" and that
"private litigation established principles before the federal government decided even to request
these principles in its litigation." J. LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VI at Twenty:
The Continuing Challenge, 1 LAB. LAW. 235, 256, 257 (1985); see also BELTON, supra note 12, at
29-30; Belton, supra note 131, at 924. But see Rose, supra note 32, at 1169-70 ("I disagree with
my colleagues who suggest that from the outset of Title VII 'the major force pushing litigation
has been private litigation, not government-initiated litigation.' "). A quarter century later this
disagreement seems pass6, but there is no denying how many Justice Department-initiated
cases, like Dillon and Local 189, resulted in significant federal court opinions.
152. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d at 804.
153. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1970).
154. Id. at 249.
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in Griggs, Judge Heebe stated that "Judge Sobeloff carefully and
extensively analyzed the legislative history of § 703(h) and
demonstrated that Congress had no intent to sustain tests which are
not justified as job related."155
With the Supreme Court oral argument in Griggs set for
December 14, 1970, the petitioners submitted their short reply brief
nine days prior. In its concluding sentences, the attorneys declared
that Duke Power's ostensibly race-neutral practices, "whether
maliciously intended or not," had "denied petitioners the opportunity
which Title VII extends to every man and woman-the right to be
judged on his or her own individual merits rather than under
arbitrary and discriminatory requirements," and should, accordingly,
be held unlawful.156
Come December 14, the LDF's Jack Greenberg presented the
argument on behalf of the Griggs plaintiffs, and in his very first
sentence he stressed that the ruling below was "a decision in which
Judge Sobeloff dissented."15 7 Twice noting that Duke Power had
adopted its intelligence-testing policy on July 2, 1965-the very date
that Title VII took effect 58-Greenberg nonetheless stressed that "any
employer may use tests and educational requirements which predict
whether an employee, or prospective employee, can do the job."159
Questioned from the bench about Duke Power's employment numbers,
Greenberg said that at issue here were "workers frozen in the Labor
Department by the test requirement of July 2, 1965, and by the fact
that they have no high school education."160
After Greenberg reserved the balance of his time, George W.
Ferguson Jr., who four years earlier had joshed to colleagues that
"[w]e need more practice before the U.S. Sup. Ct.,"161 rose on behalf of
Duke Power. He proceeded to assert that "once the employer
establishes a legitimate business purpose for an employment practice,
testing or otherwise, then that practice is non-discriminatory even if it
operates to prefer whites over blacks."162 Ten of the respondent's thirty
155. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. La. 1970).
156. Reply Brief for Petitioners, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 70-124),
1970 WL 136688, at *13.
157. Transcript of Oral Argument, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_124; see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 174-78
(describing and excerpting the arguments offered by Greenberg, by Ferguson, attorney for Duke




161. See supra text accompanying note 77 (giving the context for the joke).
162. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157.
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minutes of argument time had been yielded to Lawrence M. Cohen,
who argued on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in support of
Duke Power's position. Cohen clearly posed to the Justices the
difference between a "legitimate business purpose" test and the far
more daunting "business necessity" test Judge Sobeloff had voiced,
and he alluded as well to the "safe and efficient operation of the
employer's business" formulation that the Tenth Circuit panel had
articulated four months earlier.163 Justice Thurgood Marshall,
Greenberg's immediate predecessor as LDF Director-Counsel, pressed
Cohen about the rightfulness of imposing new educational
requirements for promotion from laborer to coal handler. When Cohen
cited legitimate business purpose as an acceptable rationale for an
employer to do so, Marshall immediately responded, "But he did it
knowing fully well that he had a prior policy of rigid segregation and
exclusion. He is not writing on a clean slate.... And he put this rule
in, as I understand it, the day the bill became effective."164
When Jack Greenberg returned to the podium, he immediately
emphasized that Griggs's record "nowhere demonstrates that this high
school education or the ability to pass the test is related to any job
that is from labor to coal handler or from coal handler to anywhere
else."165 In contrast, Greenberg stressed, "If these Petitioners were
taking a job validated, job related test and they could not pass the
test, and not passing the test indicated that they could not do the job,
we would not be here today."166 One justice named Judge Sobeloff as
agreeing with Greenberg's argument, and Chief Justice Burger posed
several queries about hospital jobs as time expired.'61
Four days later, on December 18, the Justices met in
conference to discuss Griggs. Chief Justice Burger began by
characterizing the case as "difficult and close," Justice William 0.
Douglas's notes on the discussion record. "Tests and standards must
be related to jobs. If there was no history of past discrimination,"
Burger "would have no problem" affirming the Fourth Circuit panel
majority, but the "arbitrary requirement of high school diploma has a
severe impact." Two earlier summaries of the Griggs conference have
163. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 154 (describing the "safe and efficient
operation of the business" holding of Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.); Developments in the
Law, supra note 101, at 1138 (perceptively noting how "there should be a substantial difference
between a legal standard requiring that job relatedness be shown and a standard that can be
satisfied by showing any business purpose").






relied upon only Justice Douglas's jottings,168 but Professor Belton's
The Crusade for Equality also utilizes Justice Harry A. Blackmun's
notes. Justice Douglas's summary indicates that Chief Justice Burger
"can affirm if Sobeloffs standards were accepted," and Blackmun's
notes report Burger saying he "could affirm if standards were stated
along Sobeloffs route."169 Justice Hugo L. Black, speaking next as the
most senior of the Associate Justices, said he was "inclined to affirm"
the ruling below, but Justice Douglas stated that he would vote to
reverse, as the employer had the burden of showing job relatedness,
and that "Sobeloff had the right approach." Justice John M. Harlan
said that he agreed with Justice Douglas and that "Sobeloffs view of
the act is right." Justice Potter Stewart stated he agreed with Justices
Douglas and Harlan and would reverse, as did Justices Byron White
and Thurgood Marshall. Speaking last, Justice Blackmun said he too
was "inclined to reverse," but Chief Justice Burger spoke up again to
say that "[a]n employer has a right to test for more than a particular
job." Signaling that he intended to assign Griggs to himself to write,
Burger said, "I am flexible, and can do the job by reversal or
affirmance."70
What transpired within the Chief Justice's chambers between
December 18 and when he first circulated a printed draft on January
26, 1971, remains almost entirely unknown.171 While the papers of all
eight of the other Justices who were on the Court as of early 1971 are
now publicly available to scholars, Chief Justice Burger's files will
remain closed until 2026.172 One well-known book of mixed repute,
which nonetheless has proven almost always accurate and reliable,
reported in 1979 that "[o]ne of his clerks did virtually all of the
research and drafting,"173 but efforts by this Essay's author to plumb
for helpful present-day recollections have proven unavailing.74 The
Brethren reports that Justice Potter Stewart, one of that book's
168. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 732 (Del Dickson ed., 2001);
BELTON, supra note 12, at 178; Mosnier, supra note 60, at 386. Dickson, Mosnier, and Belton all
render Justice Douglas's notoriously difficult-to-decipher handwritten jottings slightly differently
from each other.
169. BELTON, supra note 12, at 178, 181.
170. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 168, at 732.
171. BELTON, supra note 12, at 182.
172. See Warren Burger Collection, WM. & MARY (2013), http://swem.wm.edu/research/
special-collections/warren-burger-collection.
173. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 122-23 (1979); David J. Garrow,
The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 303, 318 (2001).
174. Theodore Garrett, Email to David J. Garrow, Nov. 3, 2013 (on file with the author);
David Bickart, Email to David J. Garrow, Nov, 3, 2013 (on file with the author); David J.
Garrow, Email to John M. Harmon, Nov. 3, 2013 (on file with the author).
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primary sources,175 "was surprised by Burger's draft. It was well-
written with first-rate reasoning. He was staggered, however, by the
sweeping language of the opinion."176 As Professor Belton's The
Crusade for Equality reports in full detail, Justice Stewart, along with
Justice Harlan, asked Chief Justice Burger to make modest specific
changes in the draft, all of which the Chief Justice accommodated.177
The only previous scholar to ponder how Burger's unanimous opinion
for the Griggs Court came to be what it was understandably
commented that "[w]hy Burger ultimately adopted Judge Sobeloffs
analysis, effectively without important distinctions, remains
unclear."78 At conference, Burger's own concluding statement had
suggested that he believed Sobeloffs approach would unduly curtail
employers' testing rights, yet Burger's draft opinion embraced his
fellow Justices' endorsements of Sobeloff's view while omitting his own
prior caveat.
VII. THE GRIGGS OPINION
Chief Justice Burger circulated his revised and all-but-final
draft on February 5, 1971, and then made one single wording change
at the suggestion of Justice Blackmun before Griggs was publicly
handed down on March 8.179 The opinion began by explaining clearly
how Duke Power had begun requiring a high school education for any
jobs above laborers in 1955 and then, on July 2, 1965, made a high
school education a prerequisite for transferring from laborer to any
higher post and implemented its testing requirements as well.180
Citing first the District Court's and then the Fourth Circuit's analyses
of the facts, the Chief Justice noted how "these requirements operated
to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of
Negroes."181 Moving then to the heart of the case and the language of
Title VII, Chief Justice Burger wrote that under that statute,
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." He cited,
although not by name, to Judge Sobeloffs partial dissent in the Fourth
Circuit, and while his invocation of the freezing principle did not in
175. See Garrow, supra note 173, at 304.
176. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 173, at 122-23.
177. BELTON, supra note 12, at 182-84.
178. Mosnier, supra note 60, at 387.
179. BELTON, supra note 12, at 184-85.
180. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424-28 (1971).
181. Id. at 428-29.
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any way reference either Judge Butzner or Judge Wisdom, the
derivation of the Chief Justice's conclusion was undeniably direct.182
"Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed," the
opinion explained. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touch-stone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Reiterating that
"a demonstrable relationship to successful performance" was
required,183 the unanimous opinion went on to declare that "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in-headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability." Again directly addressing Title VII, Chief Justice Burger
stated that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation" and
that Congress "placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."184 The facts of Griggs, the Chief Justice
observed, demonstrated "the inadequacy of broad and general testing
devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed
measures of capability."185
The next day's Washington Post reported that Chief Justice
Burger delivered his Griggs opinion "in the same off-hand manner" as
a previous decision two weeks earlier and quoted him as saying that
Griggs would chiefly interest "educators and employers."186
Washingtonians interested in the High Court that morning probably
paid those words less heed than they did a column headlined
"Dissension Smolders in Top Court," in which unnamed sources
alleged that Chief Justice Burger believed Justice Black "should
retire," thought of Justice Douglas as "a discredit to the court," and
regarded Justice Harlan as "lazy." But columnist Jack Anderson
presented himself as having multiple sources, for some Justices "have
182. Id. at 430. Chief Justice Burger also noted how "petitioners have long received inferior
education in segregated schools" and cited to Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 289
(1969). See also supra note 111.
183. Id. at 431; see also id. at 436 ("demonstrably a reasonable measure of job
performance").
184. Id. at 432.
185. Id. at 433.
186. Job Tests Held in Violation of Rights Act, supra note 6.
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an equally low opinion of Burger" on account of his "arbitrary,
sometimes arrogant ways."187
More relevantly, Jack Greenberg told the Wall Street Journal
that the LDF was "now ready to proceed with scores of cases involving
many thousands of workers who have been denied jobs or promotions
because of non-job-related tests which have come into widespread use
since passage" of Title VII in 1964.18 One of those cases was Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., which Julius Chambers had filed two months before
he had filed Griggs and which Judge Gordon had tried in May 1969,
but not decided until March 1970, after the Fourth Circuit's dueling
opinions in Griggs had been issued.189 Judge Gordon seemingly was
much influenced by what had transpired since his initial experience
with Title VII claims, for Professor Belton's The Crusade for Equality
reports that the LDF's unheralded brief writer, George Cooper, "was
astounded by Judge Gordon's decision ... because it seemed to him
the judge was not the same person who had decided Griggs several
years earlier."190 Robinson was appealed to the Fourth Circuit and
heard by a panel of Judges Sobeloff, Butzner, and Bryan four weeks
before Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs was handed down.
Several months later, Judge Sobeloff, writing for a unanimous panel,
was able to embrace and amplify the Griggs standard that Chief
Justice Burger's opinion had adopted from his own earlier dissent.
Terming Judge Butzner's early decision in Quarles "the
seminal opinion" and noting "the numerous cases that have followed
Quarles," Judge Sobeloff reproved Lorillard's attorneys, writing that
"[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'business purpose'-used
interchangably in the briefs-do not represent identical concepts."191
Instead, "the correct interpretation" is what Judge Wisdom had
propounded in Local 189, and "[t]he Supreme Court has conclusively
adopted this interpretation in Griggs" by invoking the freezing
principle and targeting the consequences of an employer's practices
rather than the motives. Citing as well the Tenth Circuit's holding in
187. Jack Anderson, Dissension Smolders in Top Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1971, at B13.
188. Supreme Court Bars Employment Tests That Result in Anti-Negro Discrimination,
supra note 5.
189. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970). See also Mosnier, supra
note 60, at 312-41 regarding Chambers's litigation of Robinson.
190. BELTON, supra note 12, at 207.
191. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795, 796 (4th Cir. 1971). See also United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1971), in which Judge Wilfred
Feinberg, in an opinion issued June 21, 1971, likewise termed Judge Butzner's decision in
Quarles "seminal," and BELTON, supra note 12, at 209 (quoting Judge Feinberg in a July 6, 1971,
letter to Judge Sobeloff saying about Judge Butzner's opinion in Quarles that "everyone agrees
that it had a tremendous impact").
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Jones, which the Supreme Court had declined to review the very same
day it decided Griggs,192 Judge Sobeloff stated that
these cases conclusively establish that the applicable test is not merely whether there
exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business . . . and there must be
available no alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business
purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact.193
VIII. GRIGGS'S RECEPTION, IMPACT, AND REBIRTH
Early academic commentators who addressed Griggs full well
appreciated the extent to which Chief Justice Burger's decisive
opinion was directly rooted in the preceding analyses written by
Judges Butzner; Wisdom, and Sobeloff.194 One student of the
employment discrimination landscape expressed strong doubts about
the extent to which racial discrimination was being purged from
American workplaces because of the large number of complaints that
the EEOC found to validly allege violations of Title VII but where no
successful conciliation occurred nor any litigation ensued.195 That
pattern began to be ameliorated when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to award the EEOC
meaningful enforcement authority.196 The best-informed observers
believed, though, that within two years of when Griggs was handed
down, the preceding and ensuing plethora of prominent and forceful
federal court rulings-from district court judges to the Supreme Court
but perhaps most pointedly from the courts of appeal-had already
won far more sweepingly wide proactive employer compliance with
Title VII's strictures than more casual onlookers appreciated. George
Cooper, the craftsman of so much of what the LDF's attorneys had
achieved with Title VII in the federal courts, wrote in late 1973 that
192. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Jones, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
193. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798; see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 207-08; Belton, The
Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 935 (1993).
194. Alfred W. Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 77; Hugh Steven Wilson, A Second Look at
Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of
Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 854-55 (1972).
195. WOLKINSON, supra note 81, at 129-36, especially 132 ("[P]rivate suit action was
initiated in less than 10 percent of the cases where it had found reasonable cause but was unable
to achieve a settlement.").
196. On the provisions of the 1972 Act, see Rutherglen, supra note 25, at 713-20, and
GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 443-45.
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the extent of change since 1964 "has been extraordinary"197 and that
"the Griggs principle" was "a startling breakthrough" that "has
revolutionized fair employment law."198
Come 1976, however, with only Thurgood Marshall and
William J. Brennan in complete dissent, the Supreme Court signaled
at least some discomfort with the breadth of Griggs's application by
reversing a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision that had applied
the Griggs standard in a constitutional case involving federal
employees.199 Much more starkly, one year later, writing for a similar
seven-member majority in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, Justice Potter Stewart, who had joined Griggs without
hesitation, held that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority
system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it
may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did not intend to
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to continue
to exercise those rights, even at the expense of pre-Act
discriminatees."200
The New York Times accorded that decision a two-column,
front-page, fully capitalized headline declaring, "Supreme Court Backs
Seniority Work Rules That May Discriminate"-vastly greater
prominence than it had given Griggs. The Times termed the new
ruling "a substantial setback" for civil rights proponents,201 but the
most knowledgeable Title VII scholars and litigators came to believe
that Teamsters would do African-American workers far less harm than
the Times story indicated. Alfred Blumrosen, who had followed Title
VII's enforcement history as closely as anyone, wrote several years
later, on the statute's twentieth anniversary, that "abolishing job
segregation . . . had been accomplished to a significant extent before
the Supreme Court" issued Teamsters.202 "Statistics persuasively
demonstrate," Blumrosen wrote, "that the pattern of occupational
stratification has been shattered" and "how significant a part of the
underlying evil which Title VII addressed has been corrected," such
that "more than two million minority workers were in improved
197. George Cooper, Introduction: Fair Employment Law Today, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 263, 264 (1973).
198. Id. at 265.
199. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238, 239 n.10, 251 (1976).
200. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
201. Lesley Oelsner, Supreme Court Backs Seniority Work Rules That May Discriminate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1977, at Al.
202. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence
of Employment Discrimination, 6 INDUS. RELATIONS L.J. 313, 346 (1984); see also ALFRED W.
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAw (1993).
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circumstances in 1980" compared to where they would have stood
absent the federal courts.203 Reviewing jobs data, Blumrosen
concluded that "[t]he extraordinary pace of improvement in
occupational status may have slowed because the worst of the pattern
of discrimination has been shattered by the law."204
Julius Chambers, who succeeded Jack Greenberg as Director-
Counsel of the LDF, strongly concurred with Blumrosen's analysis and
conclusions. "One of the great achievements of Title VII is that the
segregated job patterns were largely undone by the mid-1970s" in
many industries, Chambers believed. "During the decade when the
Quarles ruling," as amplified by Griggs, enjoyed adoption across most
federal judicial circuits, "many-perhaps most-discriminatory
seniority systems were changed by court orders or voluntarily by
companies and unions fearful of a lawsuit," Chambers stated.205
Professor Belton, who litigated Griggs alongside Chambers, agreed
fully with his colleague and Blumrosen's views, writing in The
Crusade for Equality that "[b]y 1977, many employers and unions in
many industries had made changes in their seniority practices, either
voluntarily or by court decrees, that permitted African
Americans . . . to transfer with full carryover seniority to jobs and
departments historically denied to them because of their race." Those
changes had "opened up thousands of jobs for African Americans that
had previously been denied to them."206
Chambers remarked upon "the good fortune that the Supreme
Court did not decide Teamsters earlier than it did," but some
contemporaneous critics sought to minimize Griggs's significance,
although not its impact, by asserting that Duke Power's practices had
made the case a highly unrepresentative one. Duke Power was "a
company with a history of racial discrimination in employment, a
company that added the aptitude test requirement on the very date
the law against employment discrimination became effective," one
such critic wrote. "The validity of aptitude testing for all employers
was thus decided on a factual record evoking suspicion about the
203. Blumrosen, supra note 202, at 347-48.
204. Id. at 351.
205. Julius L. Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII. The Continuing Challenge of
Establishing Fair Employment Practices, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1986); see also
Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 151, at 247; GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 418 (crediting
Quarles and Griggs for "improved employment opportunities for thousands of blacks");
WOLKINSON, supra note 81, at 132 (also crediting Quarles).
206. BELTON, supra note 12, at 277, 226.
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motives of the particular employer before the Court."207 Another
writer, making the same complaint more succinctly, stated that "[i]n
hindsight, Griggs appears to be a case of obvious pretextual
discrimination,"08 while commentators of a more conservative bent
alleged that Griggs was the product of a "radical legal strategy" cooked
up primarily by attorneys at the EEOC in knowing and intentional
defiance of Title VII's clear language.209
Critics of that ilk took pleasure when the Supreme Court, first
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust210 in 1988, then far more
decisively a year later in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio211 and
Lorance u. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,212 temporarily "sounded the death
knell for the Griggs disparate impact theory"213 by replacing Griggs's
"business necessity" standard with a far more deferential "legitimate
employment goals" test.214 Professor Belton's The Crusade for Equality
discusses all of those cases in appropriate detail,215 but what of course
bears far greater emphasis is how congressional passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 reversed the impact of those rulings and expressly
codified Griggs's disparate impact standard in statutory law.2 16 The
Crusade for Equality gives rich summary coverage to those
developments as well, allowing Professor Belton to welcome the
rebirth of the doctrine he had helped generate. 217
207. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 42 (1977); see also Selmi, supra
note 15, at 713-14 (asserting that "[t]he vast majority of seniority cases ... involved employers
that had previously discriminated explicitly against their African-American employees").
208. Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 1331; see also id. at 1302-03 (regarding Michael Evans
Gold, Griggs's Folly, 7 INDUS. RELATIONS L.J. 429 (1985)).
209. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 250, 387; see also Maltz, supra note 14, at 1372 (noting that
the Griggs Court "went beyond the original understanding" of Title VII). But see Susan D. Carle,
A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 255, 294
(2011) (criticizing Graham).
210. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
211. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
212. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
213. BELTON, supra note 12, at 282; see also Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs
Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (1990).
214. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659, 661.
215. BELTON, supra note 12, at 282-89.
216. See Robert Belton, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Action: A
Preliminary Assessment, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1085 (1992); Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil
Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 990-98 (1993); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate
Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004).
217. BELTON, supra note 12, at 300-15.
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IX. CONCLUSION: How COURTS MAKE LAW
In 1965, one particularly prescient writer acknowledged that
the "enforcement of Title VII has been thrust directly upon the federal
judiciary" and appreciated how "the courts must fashion a new body of
federal case law."2 18 Soon after Griggs, another commentator
reiterated how "the ultimate enforcement and interpretation of Title
VII have been left to the federal judiciary."219 In 1986, Chambers and
a colleague stated that "[w]ithout Griggs, Title VII would have had
little impact upon the historic problems of discrimination which it was
intended to correct" and also emphasized how the degree of change
that had taken place was due in significant part to "the interpretation
by Judges Butzner, Wisdom and others of Title VII as a remedial
statute designed to remove 'barriers' to equal employment
opportunity" and not just police employers' motives and intent.220
Law professors rightly characterize the Griggs opinion itself as
"remarkably sweeping"221 and correctly acknowledge how "[i]n many
ways, the Griggs revolution has been spectacular and [how]
employment practices across America have been influenced by the
holding."2 22 The entirely accurate assertion that "the theory of
disparate impact is a creation of the federal courts"2 23 and "an example
of federal common law" 224 might seem so transparently obvious as to
occasion almost no dissent whatsoever.225 But the far more
fundamental and important truth, yet one rarely acknowledged or
adequately emphasized, has been most perceptively appreciated and
articulated by Professor Blumrosen.
218. Comment, supra note 25, at 454, 464 n.226.
219. Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 118 (1974).
220. Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 205, at 16, 18; see also Chambers & Goldstein, supra
note 151, at 248, 247; Cooper, supra note 197, at 265 (answering the rhetorical question, "Who is
responsible for these developments?" with "First and most important are the federal courts").
221. Estreicher, supra note 17, at 157.
222. Shoben, supra note 216, at 598; see also BELTON, supra note 12, at 322-26 (surveying
disparate impact theory's impact beyond employment law); Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W.
Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimination: American Oddity or Internationally Accepted
Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 108 (1998). But see Shoben, supra note 216, at 622
(allowing that disparate impact "has not been the subject of much reported litigation"); Selmi,
supra note 15, at 753 (contending that disparate impact theory "has been less transformative
than many scholars and advocates assume").
223. Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 1345.
224. Id. at 1344.
225. But see Carle, supra note 209, at 294 (incorrectly claiming that "the doctrine was the
product of decades of lower-profile development among several generations of civil rights
activists and sympathetic regulators," rather than federal judges and federal court litigators).
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Writing even well before Griggs but in the wake of first Judge
Butzner's ruling in Quarles and then Judge Heebe's first decision in
Local 189, Blumrosen spoke of "the radiating effect of broadly and
soundly written judicial decisions which can provide a basis for
practical results without protracted proceedings."22 6 In the rapidly
developing law of Title VII, Judge Butzner's analysis in Quarles would
remain the touchstone upon which Judge Wisdom and later Judge
Sobeloff would build, but the "radiating effect" that Blumrosen
perceived and understood can be seen in other, even contemporaneous,
areas of rapidly developing law. In September 1972, Judge Jon 0.
Newman had been a U.S. District Judge in Connecticut for barely nine
months, but his opinion for a special three-judge district court in an
abortion rights lawsuit named Abele v. Markle227 would, in less than
three months, prove to have a decisive and indeed arguably
determinative influence on several Supreme Court Justices who were
actively influencing the composition228 of the soon-to-be majority
opinions in Roe v. Wade229 and Doe v. Bolton.230
In Roe and Doe, Judge Newman's district court opinion,
thanks primarily to Justices Lewis F. Powell Jr. and Potter Stewart,
proved just as influential as did the lower court opinions of Judges
Butzner, Wisdom, and Sobeloff in Griggs. Supreme Court opinions do
not come from nowhere, and far more often than legal academia takes
the time and effort to fully plumb, they come, as Griggs's history so
richly reveals, almost directly from the pens (or keyboards) of the most
acute and perceptive judges of the lower federal courts. In the case of
Title VII, prior to the publication of Professor Belton's The Crusade for
Equality, Alfred Blumrosen was far and away the commentator who
most fully appreciated a historical record that was hiding, at least
from some observers, almost entirely in plain view.
"Title VII law," Blumrosen wrote in 1984, "was developed in
important part" by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and "confirmed" by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs.231 Judge Butzner's opinion in
Quarles had been "particularly influential," but so too were the
226. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of
Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268, 317 (1969).
227. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
228. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 565-66, 568, 574, 583, 588, 597 (rev. ed.
1998); David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, 22 AM. LAW. 80, 82-83 (2000); David J.
Garrow, Roe Revisited, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 71, 78-79 (2005); Andrew D. Hurwitz, Jon 0. Newman
and the Abortion Decisions: A Remarkable First Year, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 231 (2003).
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
230. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
231. Blumrosen, supra note 202, at 340.
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subsequent opinions written by Judges Wisdom and Sobeloff, as "the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal wrote a remarkable chapter
in the history of statutory interpretation. They created a
jurisprudence of Title VII which was calculated to simplify the attack
on segregated employment systems" and that other circuits, such as
the Tenth and Second, cited and directly followed.232 "The strong
medicine of southern jurisprudence," Blumrosen stressed,
"precipitated the abandonment of many discriminatory industrial
relations practices" and demonstrated "that unions and employers
would give up the 'southern way' in employment without the 'massive
resistance' of [the] school segregation cases."233 Griggs "provided
authoritative support for the southern jurisprudence which was the
bedrock" of the judicial assault on segregative employment practices,
and "Griggs broadened the substance of Title VII beyond previous
expectations and provided the legal foundation for the changes in
employment practices which followed."234
Blumrosen was entirely correct to emphasize "the immense
social and economic consequences of the jurisprudence of the southern
circuits in shattering the fabric of discrimination,"235 and Professor
Belton's fine work amplifies and meshes almost seamlessly with the
insights and conclusions Blumrosen first articulated over a quarter
century ago. Griggs, Professor Belton writes, "ushered in one of the
greatest social movements in the history of this nation because it
opened up jobs and other employment opportunities, previously
limited to white males, in both the public and private sectors for
millions of African Americans, women," and members of other ethnic
minority groups. Such an outcome, Professor Belton emphasizes,
"would not have been possible under the traditional intent-based
disparate treatment theory of discrimination,"236 which predominated
prior to the lower court cases that culminated in Griggs.
Soon after Griggs's twentieth anniversary, in the one thorough
effort ever undertaken to survey how all of the still-living members of
Griggs's original group of plaintiffs felt about the case's impact on
their own lives, every one of them reported that they had obtained
better jobs and benefitted economically from the changes the litigation
brought about at Duke Power.237 Professor Belton's The Crusade for
232. Id. at 322, 342.
233. Id. at 346, 351, 350.
234. Id. at 350, 342.
235. Id. at 350.
236. BELTON, supra note 12, at 3.
237. Jubera, supra note 21.
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Equality recounts those stories as well as the case's own formal
denouement before Judge Gordon in the years after the Supreme
Court's ruling.238 Once again, the comprehensive breadth and richness
of Professor Belton's posthumously published history encompasses not
only Griggs's own particular story but also all of the related
developments and litigation concerning Title VII from the 1960s on
through the 1990s. This instructive and invaluable work of history is
both a lasting reminder of Professor Robert Belton's distinguished
career as a litigator, law teacher, and scholar. It is an enduring tribute
to how the often-forgotten efforts of litigators like Julius Chambers
and Jack Greenberg and jurists like John Butzner, John Minor
Wisdom, and Simon Sobeloff tangibly improved the lives of millions of
Americans.
238. BELTON, supra note 12, at 316-22.
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